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PRESERVING THE PEACE:
THE CONTINUING BAN ON WAR
BETWEEN STATES
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL*
The history of international law is, in large part, about the
development of restraints on states' right to resort to force in dealing
with external conflicts.' Today, states may use force only in selfdefense to an armed attack or with Security Council authorization.
Even in these cases, states may use force only as a last resort, and then
only if doing so will not disproportionately harm civilians, their
property, or the natural environment. These rules restricting force are
found in treaties (especially the United Nations Charter), customary
international law, and the general principles of international law. In
other words, the three primary sources of international law yield
important rules restricting the use of force. The rules on use of force,
like all international law rules, are binding on states for the same
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reason the law of any jurisdiction binds-because it is accepted as law
by the community.
The following remarks on the rules regulating the use of force are
divided into three parts. Part I provides a brief history and overview
of the current rules on the use of force. Part II applies these rules to
assertions that the United States could lawfully attack Iran today. Part
III then discusses why these rules are binding as law and answers
arguments to the contrary. These remarks will, therefore, touch on the
past, present, and future of the law on the use of force to preserve the
peace between states.
I. THE BAN ON WAR BETWEEN STATES

A primary, if not the only, purpose of international law is to aid in
the peaceful settlement of disputes among states.
In human
communities, we know that governing by force eventually evolved to
governing by law. The right to use force within a community was
restricted to law enforcement activities; the right to use force among
communities became increasingly restricted as well, especially
through international law. Modern international law is dated to the
1648 Peace of Westphalia, a set of important treaties ending Europe's
Thirty Years' War.2 The Peace of Westphalia established principles
meant to prevent new conflicts and instituted means designed to
enforce these new principles. These means included collective action
against wrongdoers and a requirement to employ negotiation or
arbitration before resort to force.3
The Peace of Westphalia remained in effect until the
revolutionary leaders of France, who believed their ideas were
superior ideas and should therefore be imposed throughout Europe,
decided to go to war. The decision to go to war coincided with the
developing concept of sovereignty which included the idea that a state
had the right to use force whenever its leaders wished. Such an
unlimited right to resort to force plainly made no sense if there was to
be an international legal order of any kind. Yet legal scholars who no
longer believed in a higher law, law above nation states, had no

2. Id. at 114-17.
3. Id.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/7
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arguments based in law against the leaders of sovereign states
resorting to force at will.
By the start of the twentieth century and with the development of
more technologically advanced and, therefore, more lethal weapons,
states finally gave their consent to binding instruments limiting the
right to resort to armed force. It was technology, not a new way of
dealing with the problem of sovereign states and binding law, that led
to the breakthrough. States came together in 1899 and 1907 at the two
Hague Peace Conferences in the Netherlands to re-establish legal
principles to support peace and provide alternatives to war. 4 A
primary accomplishment of these conferences was the first
multilateral treaty that outlawed armed conflict to collect contract
debts.5
The new rules promoting peace had little impact, however, in
restraining states' resort to war in 1914. The assassination of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire's heir to the throne by a secret pro-Serbian
nationalist group triggered World War I. The assassination seemed to
be the very sort of conflict that should have been containable under
methods for peaceful resolution of disputes provided for in the 1899
and 1907 Hague Conventions. Instead, a war involving most of
Europe, the United States, and colonies around the world erupted. In
shock over the senseless loss of life and devastation, statesmen agreed
in 1920 to prohibitions on resort to force in the Covenant of the
League of Nations. 6 Additionally, they agreed on collective action to
enforce the prohibitions and creation of a new international court to
resolve disputes.7 Although the League had been the brainchild of
U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, it was the automatic obligation to

4. See WILLIAM I. HULL, THE Two HAGUE CONFERENCES AND THEIR
CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 2-4 (1908) (discussing the historical

background and political context in which the 1898 and 1907 Hague Conferences
were held). See also Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of
Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, 1
Bevans 607 [hereinafter Convention on Contract Debts].
5. Convention on Contract Debts, supra note 4, arts. 1-7.
6. See generally Covenant of the League of Nations (1920) (establishing,
among other things, plans for a Permanent Court of International Justice to hear
cases involving international disputes).
7. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 127-29; see also Covenant of the
League of Nations arts. 11 & 14 (1920).
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join in collective action against unlawful uses of force that kept
American senators from voting to ratify the League's Covenant. 8 The
United States did want to take some action to support restraint on war,
however, and joined with France to promote the 1928 Kellogg-Briand
Pact, which outlawed war as an instrument of national policy.9
Despite the Pact, Hitler, convinced of Germany's superiority and
of its natural right to be the dominant power in Europe, gained control
of neighboring states and then invaded Poland in 1939. Japan's
leaders had a similar conviction of superiority and a similar
determination to rule over, or even eliminate, peoples they considered
inferior. World War II shocked humanity-and the United States-into
taking the next step towards outlawing the use of force. In addition to
a general prohibition on the use of force, as found in the KelloggBriand Pact, the victorious states also agreed to establish the United
Nations Security Council-a powerful body designed to enforce the
prohibition on force. The prohibition is found in Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter.
The Charter contains two exceptions to the
1
0
prohibition.
The first is found in Article 51, which permits
individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs." The
second exception is found in Articles 39 and 42, providing for the
Security Council's right to authorize force if necessary to restore

8.

INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 126-27.

9. IAN BROWNLM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
80-83 (1963); Kellogg-Briand Pact for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, 46
Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
10. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.: "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations."
11. Id. art. 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/7
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international peace in the face of a "threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression .... -12
A U.S. delegate to the 1945 San Francisco conference called to
draft the Charter made clear that "the intention of the authors of the
original text was to state in the broadest terms an absolute allinclusive prohibition; ... there should be no loopholes."'

3

The overall

structure of the Charter that emerged in San Francisco is consistent
with the broad scope of Article 2(4). Articles 39 and 42 gave the
Security Council expansive authority to use force against threats. By
contrast, Article 51 established that states acting without Security
Council authority have only a narrow right to use force. Article 51
permits force in individual and collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs, and then only until the Security Council takes action.
Latin American delegates had requested the inclusion of Article
51 near the end of the conference.' 4 These delegates were concerned
that the Rio Treaty arrangements for collective self-defense would be
invalidated by Article 2(4). Thus, in order to clarify that Article 2(4)
did not prohibit either the right of individual or collective selfdefense, Article 51 was added to the Charter. Article 51 is a limited
exception to Article 2(4), allowing self-defense in situations where it
can be shown by the tangible evidence of an armed attack that a state
must respond. Further, the attacked state's response is limited to
defense and lasts only until the Security Council acts or the defense is
achieved.' 5 Central in the minds of the U.N. Charter's drafters was
the excuse the Axis states used for violating the League Covenant and
Kellogg-Briand Pact during World War II. The Axis powers made
self-defense claims when justifying their actions: Germany claimed
the need for Lebensraum (living space), and Japan claimed the need
for access to natural resources. Thus, the new United Nations would
permit unilateral self-defense only in cases where objective evidence
of an emergency existed for the entire world to see, namely an actual
armed attack. Other, less tangible or immediate threats were to be
submitted to the collective scrutiny of the Security Council before the
12. Id. art. 39.
13. Conference on Int'l Org., S.F., Cal., Apr. 25, 1945, Commission I General
Provisions,art. 7, para. 4.
14. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 226.
15. Id. at 226-27; see also U.N. Charter art. 51.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
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use of force would be permitted. The Charter's drafters believed that
collective deliberation of the Council would be a better process for
determining threats to the peace than would the unilateral decision of
the potential victim.
Since the Charter was drafted, numerous decisions of the
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), resolutions of the Security
Council and U.N. General Assembly, and official government
statements have confirmed the binding nature of the Charter's rules
Indeed, the international community has
and their meaning.
repeatedly affirmed its support for the regime of peace and the
prohibition on war between states. The most recent and significant
reaffirmation came with the overwhelming vote of confidence in the
Charter during the 2005 World Summit. 16 Some claim these rules

became obsolete after the September 11 attacks, but it was in 2005four years after the attacks-that the world reaffirmed the rules.
Today, the rules on self-defense include the reaffirmed U.N.
Charter provisions and several important general principles of
international law. 17 In brief, a state may use significant force on the
territory of another state when the following four conditions are met:
1. A significant actual armed attack has occurred or is
occurring;
2. The armed response is aimed at the armed attacker or
those legally responsible for the attacker;
3. The response has the purpose of stopping the on-going
attack and/or the next imminent attacks;
4. The response is necessary to remove the threat and is
proportional in the circumstances.' 8
The I.C.J., in its 1986 decision Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua),made clear that acts
triggering the right to use armed force in self-defense must themselves
amount to armed attacks.' 9 In Nicaragua, the I.C.J. held that low77-80, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N.
16. 2005 World Sunmmit Outcome Document,
Doc. AIRES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
17. General principles of law are the third primary source of international law
after treaties and customary international law, see Statute of the International Court
of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(c), 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
18. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L.
REv. 889, 889-90 (2002) [hereinafter Self-Defense].
19. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Nicaragua), 1986
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level shipments of weapons did not amount to an armed attack and
could not be invoked as a basis for self-defense.2 °
It is important to realize that "self-defense" is a term of art in
international law. The reference in Article 51 to self-defense is a
reference to the right of the victim state to use significant offensive
military force on the territory of a state legally responsible for the
attack. 2' The I.C.J. has made clear that the armed attack that gives
rise to this right of self-defense must involve a significant amount of
force, more than would be involved in a mere frontier incident, 22 such
as sporadic rocket fire across a border.
In addition to demonstrating that they have a lawful basis for
using force under the Charter, states using force must also show that
using force is necessary to achieve a defensive purpose. If a state can
make that showing, it must then show that the method of force used
will not result in a disproportionate loss of life and destruction
compared to the value of the objective. These principles of necessity
and proportionality are not expressly mentioned in the Charter, but the
I.C.J., in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear
Weapons), held "there is a 'specific rule whereby self-defence would
warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and
necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary
to Article 51 of
international law.' This dual condition applies equally
23
employed.,
force
of
means
the
whatever
the Charter,
An armed response to a terrorist attack or a nuclear weapons
program will almost never meet the I.C.J.'s parameters for the lawful
exercise of self-defense. Terrorist attacks are generally treated as
crimes: they are clandestine, one-off attacks and not like armed

I.C.J. 14, 103, 119-20 (June 27).

20. Id.
21. Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 215 (July 9) (separate opinion of
Judge Higgins).

22. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103. Accord Jus Ad Bellum (Eth. v. Eri.),
Ethiopia's Claims Nos. 1-8, Partial Award (Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Comm'n Dec.
19, 2005), 45 ILM 430 (2006).
23. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons),
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 245 (July 8) (quoting I.C.J. Reports 1986 at 94).

See also Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 94; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161,
198 (Nov. 6).
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attacks that can give rise to the right of self-defense. 4 A textbook
case of self-defense under Article 51 is the response to Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, Kuwait had the right to use
force in self-defense, and other states had the right to join Kuwait in
collective self-defense in order to help liberate it.25 Iraq's invasion
contained at least two aspects not typically found in connection with
most terrorist attacks. First, no one doubted who carried out the
aggression; it was Iraq. Second, the occupation of Kuwait created a
continuing wrong that could be righted, especially since the Security
Council had authorized a coalition of states to liberate Kuwait.26
In the case of September 11, and other terrorist attacks (Bali 2002,
Madrid 2005, London 2006), the first task of the victim state was
gathering evidence to discover who was responsible. Solid evidence
on such questions as to who carried out an attack has been the central
focus of the debate among states over the right to use force in
response to terrorism. Because the state must respond quickly to an
armed attack and may even anticipate the attack in some
circumstances, states have a problem responding lawfully using
military force in the case of terrorist attacks. Terrorist attacks are
usually brief and do not result in an ongoing wrong such as the
unlawful occupation of a territory. It usually takes some time to find
out who the perpetrators are and where they are currently located. But
force may not be used long after the attack occurred. Responding
weeks or months later constitutes unlawful reprisal, not an act of selfdefense.
Some may believe that reprisals have a deterrent effect, but they
are not considered lawful measures of self-defense because they do
not repel ongoing armed attacks nor do they dislodge an unlawful
occupation. Some scholars, including Louis Henkin, have argued that
if terrorists undertake an ongoing series of attacks in relatively short
order, the victim state may attack the state responsible for the
terrorists. 27 While Henkin's argument may be persuasive in theory,

24.

See

LOUISE RICHARDSON, WHAT TERRORISTS WANT: UNDERSTANDING THE

ENEMY, CONTAINING THE THREAT 4 (2006).
25. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibitionon the Use of Force: The
U.N. 's Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 479-80 (1991).

26. Id. at 479.
27. LouIs HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/7
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the problem in real cases is obtaining the required evidence. The
victim of terrorists may have some evidence of a plan of future
attacks, but that evidence is not the same as the reality of experiencing
an on-going attack. Evidence of plans from secret intelligence sources
is not always reliable. In several cases where states have used force in
response to terrorist acts and claimed self-defense, they have been
criticized. 28
The United States and United Kingdom made a case to justify the
use of force against Afghanistan in 2001, and it seems to have been
generally accepted in the international community. 29 The United
Kingdom released some evidence on October 4, 2001, tending to trace
the September 11 attacks to al Qaeda and showing links between al
Qaeda and the Taliban, Afghanistan's de facto government. The
United States also presented evidence linking al Qaeda to the attacks,
evidence that NATO found "compelling." 30 On the other hand, the
I.C.J. ruled in Nicaragua in 1986, Democratic Republic of Congo v.
Uganda (Congo) in 2005, and Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
31
Montenegro (Bosnia) in 2007 that the test of attribution is control.
This test may ultimately mean that the links between al Qaeda and the
Taliban were too weak to justify using force in self-defense on the
territory of Afghanistan.
There was also the problem in Afghanistan of the disproportionate
use of force. During his October 2001 visit to Pakistan, U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed hope that moderates within
the Taliban might be persuaded to join a new democratic

(1995).
28. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Evidence of Terror, 7 J. OF CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 19, 34 (2002) (indicating that "Israel's response to terror attacks
perpetrated by Palestinians and other anti-Israeli groups operating out of Lebanon
have been particularly criticized for their lack of proportionality.").
29. Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self Defense, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 839, 842 (2001) [hereinafter Right of Self Defense]; see also Self-Defense,
supra note 18, at 892-93, 899-901.
30. Right of Self Defense, supra note 29, at 842.
31. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 64-65; Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 116, [ 160, 214 (Dec. 19),
available at http://www.icj-cij.orgldocket/files/1 16/10455.pdf; Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 91, T 391 (Feb. 26), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf.
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The United States was presumably aiming at
government.
eliminating the offensive capability of al Qaeda, not the elimination of
the Taliban, but this is not what occurred. Whether the United States
gave the green light or not, the Northern Alliance ousted the Taliban
from Kabul. 33 The continued use of force by U.S. personnel after al
Qaeda camps were destroyed and its fighters were on the run may
have violated the proportionality principle.
More troubling was the decision of the United States, United
Kingdom, and Australia to invade Iraq in 2003 despite the total
absence of any indication of an armed attack occurring. The coalition
partners instead attempted to assert a lingering right to use force under
Security Council resolutions authorizing collective force to liberate
Kuwait in 1990 and 1991. The authorization to use force in those
34
resolutions, however, was for liberating Kuwait, not invading Iraq.
Even the British Attorney-General advised Prime Minister Tony Blair
to get new Security Council authorization. Some may believe that it
32. Pamela Constable, U.S. Hopes to Attract Moderates in Taliban; Powell
Sees Them in 'New Afghanistan,' WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2001, at A24.
33. Some accounts indicate that Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave a positive indication to the Northern Alliance to
take Kabul. Andrew Sullivan, Remind Me, Who Put This Triumph Together?,
SUNDAY TIMES (U.K.), Nov. 18, 2001.
The Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith advised that a new resolution
34.
would be needed. Full Text: Iraq Legal Advice-The Full Text of the Advice About
the Legality of War with Iraq Given by the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, to the
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, on March 7, 2003, GUARDIAN, Apr. 28, 2005, available
Richard Nortonat http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,5182009-103550,00.html.
Taylor, Revealed: The Government's Secret Legal Advice on the Iraq War,
GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 28, 2005, at 1. ("The attorney general [Lord Goldsmith]
warned Mr. Blair that Britain might be able to argue it could go to war on the basis
of past UN resolutions, but only if there were 'strong factual grounds' that Iraq was
still in breach of its disarmament obligations."). See also Global Policy Forum,
British Attorney General's Advice to Blair on Legality of Iraq War, Mar. 7, 2003,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/O307advice.htm.
"In other words, we would need to be able to demonstrate hard evidence of noncompliance and non-cooperation [to justify use of force against Iraq]." Id. para. 29.
For analysis of resort to war in Iraq and conclusion that it was unlawful, see Richard
Falk, What Futurefor the UN CharterSystem of War Prevention?, 97 AM. J. INT'L
L. 590, 592-93 (2003); Sean Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92
GEO. L. REv. 173, 177 (2005); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Addendum to Armed Force in
Iraq: Issues of Legality, ASIL INSIGHTS, Apr. 2003, http://www.asil.org
/insights/insigh99a 1.htm.
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was better for the United States and its partners to, nevertheless, at
least attempt to justify the invasion under the Charter than to assert
they were free to do as they pleased. This is no doubt true, but it
should not obscure how weak the attempt at justification was, nor how
clearly illegal was the invasion. By 2007, the U.S. policies in both
Afghanistan and Iraq, especially policies in defiance of international
law, were synonymous with debacle.
II. THE BAN ON WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN35
Despite ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, planning was
apparently well underway in the Bush Administration in 2006 for an
attack on Iran. 36 Knowledgeable scholars indicated that the planning
included legal arguments meant to justify an attack tied to Iran's
engagement in unlawful actions such as supplying munitions to Iraqi
insurgents or assisting Hezbollah in Lebanon to attack Israel. 37 The
argument would invoke a U.S. right of collective self-defense with
Israel or Iraq. 38 Apparently, the United States would not argue that it
had the right to use force against Iran for having a nuclear program.
Presumably, it accepted that even if Iran was developing a nuclear

35. This section is adapted from Mary Ellen O'Connell & Maria Alveras-Chen,
The Ban on the Bomb-And Bombing: Iran, the U.S., and the InternationalLaw of
Self-Defense, 57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 497 (2007).

36. According to journalist Seymour M. Hersh, the use of armed force,
including the use of a tactical nuclear bomb, was very much on the table. Seymour
M. Hersh, Last Stand; The Military's Problem With the President's Iran Policy,
NEW YORKER, July 10, 2006, at 42. See also Seymour M. Hersh, The Redirection,
Is the Administration's New Policy Benefitting Our Enemies in the War on
Terrorism?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 5, 2007, at 52; Seymour M. Hersh, The Next Act: Is
a Damaged Administration Less Likely to Attack Iran, or More?, NEW YORKER,
Nov. 27, 2006, at 94; Seymour M. Hersh, The Iran Plans: Would PresidentBush Go
to War to Stop Tehranfrom Getting the Bomb?, NEW YORKER, Apr. 17, 2006, at 30.
37. See Gregory E. Maggs, How the United States Might Justify a Preemptive
Strike on a Rogue Nation's Nuclear Weapon Development Facilities Under the U.N.

Charter,57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 465, 482 (2007). The Bush Administration began
complaining about Iran supplying munitions to Afghani insurgents during the week
of June 3, 2007. Afghan officials, however, rejected assertions that the insurgents
were being supplied by Iran.
38. Id.
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weapon, possession of a nuclear weapon does not give rise to the right
39
to use force in self-defense without Security Council authorization.
Yet, the collective self-defense argument in this case is hardly
better. Under the test used in Nicaragua and its progeny, states are
restricted from using force in collective self-defense unless there is a
significant armed attack (not a mere border incident or weapons
shipment as alleged respecting Iran).4 ° In addition, the state attacked
must be legally responsible for the armed attack (not just a financier
and/or trainer), and the victim of the attack must formally request the
assistance of other states in collective self-defense. 4' None of these
conditions was met by the United States with respect to Iran in 2006.
Even if they had been, the United States would have had to join in a
collective response aimed at ending the activity giving rise to the right
of collective self-defense. It could not have taken aim at some
entirely different target. If what the United States really wanted to do,
as many suspect, is bomb nuclear research sites, bombing such sites
would not respond to border incursions into Iraq or to the financing,
supplying, and training of armed militant groups in Lebanon or
elsewhere.
In addition to the lack of a significant armed attack by Iran, the
principles of necessity and proportionality would also restrict the use
of military force in this case. As explained above, offensive military
operations must aim at the activity triggering the right to use force in
the first instance. The principle of necessity requires that the use of
force also have a reasonable likelihood of successfully accomplishing
the military objective. Bombing nuclear research sites would do
nothing to halt the funding of Hezbollah, nor would it cut off supplies
to insurgents. Bombing would not even stop Iran's nuclear program.
As a recent Human Rights Watch report correctly observed,
military necessity does grant military planners a certain degree of
freedom of judgment about the appropriate tactics for carrying out a
military operation, [but] 'it can never justify a degree of violence
which exceeds the level which is strictly necessary to ensure the

39. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 244.
40. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103.
41. Id. at 120.
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42
success of a particular operation in a particular case.'

Given all that is not known, ensuring success in such an operation
is impossible. Allegations of the existence of an Iranian program to
develop nuclear weapons remain largely unsubstantiated.4 3 The
Guardian reported in February 2007 that the International Atomic
44
Energy Agency (IAEA) disputed U.S. evidence of a bomb program.
Even if Iran's activities have aimed at building a nuclear weapon,
former U.S. officials indicated in early 2007 that Iran could not have a
weapon for at least two years. Further, "Iran's uranium enrichment
program is spread out; it is believed some facilities are underground at
unknown locations. There would be no guarantee of ending the
program [through bombing]. 4a
Indeed, even former Pentagon
analysts agree that "there are no effective military ways to wipe out a
nuclear program that has been well hidden and broadly dispersed
46
across the country, including in crowded cities."

Not only would an attack likely fail to meet the presumed
objective, the Oxford Research Group reports an attack would, in fact,
be counterproductive.47 A military strike using conventional or
42. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JENIN: IDF MILITARY OPERATIONS 11-12 (2002)
(quoting ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO
THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 396 (Int'l Comm. of the Red
Cross, ed., 1987)).
43. See Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran 11, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15

(Feb. 27, 2006). The report did, however, reveal certain causes for concern,
including the discovery of an Iranian manual outlining "the fabrication of nuclear
weapon components." Id. at 4-5. It also noted an overall lack of transparency
regarding "the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme" during the three years
of intensive IAEA verification activities that preceded the report. Id. at 11.
44.

Julian Borger, U.S. Intelligence on Iran Does Not Stand Up, GUARDIAN

(London), Feb. 22, 2007, at 21.
45.

Trudy Rubin, Iran Sounds Like a Bad Rerun, Administration'sHints Show

It's LearnedNothing from Iraq War, NEWSDAY, Apr. 12, 2006, at A39.
46. Thom Shanker et al., U.S. Wants to Block Iran's Nuclear Ambition, but
Diplomacy Seems to Be the Only Path, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, at 1.
47. Kate Kelland, Air Strikes on Iran Could Backfire: Report, REUTERS NEWS,
Mar. 4, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL036676520070305; see also

Frank Barnaby, Would Air Strikes Work? Understanding ran's Nuclear Programme
and the Possible Consequences of a Military Strike (Oxford Research Group
Briefing Paper, at 12-13, Mar. 2007).
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nuclear weapons in the absence' of compelling evidence of a weapons
program--indeed, and worse still, with the knowledge that, even if
there were such a program, it could not be effectively contained by
and
the principles of necessity
violate
bombing-would
proportionality. Use of nuclear weapons in such a scenario would be
not only completely unlawful, it would immediately classify the
United States as a pariah in the opinion of much of the world.
Finally, in addition to the rules on armed attack, necessity, and
proportionality, a U.S.-led strike against Iran would need to be
preceded by an invitation by Israel or Iraq for the United States to join
Perhaps Israel would request such
in collective self-defense.4 8
assistance, but the current Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, is a
Shi'a Muslim, like many Iranians, and is wholly unlikely to request
U.S. help in attacking Iran on behalf of Iraq.
With so much focus on the use of force in the United States in
recent years, U.S. leaders seem to overlook the fact that the
international community has other, non-lethal, means to encourage
compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to terminate
assistance to terrorists and insurgents. Ukraine and South Africa gave
up nuclear weapons and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). 49 Libya gave up a weapons program; Brazil gave up its
program as well. No military force was needed in any of these cases.
The United States could itself comply with the NPT and reduce its
nuclear arsenal, leading by example. 50 These are alternatives open to
the United States and consistent with international law's narrow right
of self-defense. What would be most unwise would be to allow an
expansion of self-defense. It would be unwise if we care about peace
and human rights. Although twenty years have since passed, what
Henkin wrote in the late 1980s remains equally salient today:
It is not in the interest of the United States to reconstrue the law of
the Charter so as to dilute and confuse its normative prohibitions.
48.

Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 120.

49. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, openedfor signature
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S 161.
50. See id. art. VI. See also Steven E. Miller, Proliferation,Disarmamentand
the Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 50-69 (Morten Bremer Maerli & Sverre Lodgaard eds.,
2007).
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In our decentralized international political system with primitive
institutions and underdeveloped law enforcement machinery, it is
important that Charter norms-which go to the heart of
international order and implicate war and peace in the nuclear
age-be clear, sharp, and comprehensive; as independent as
possible of judgments of degree and of issues of fact; as
invulnerable as can be to self-serving interpretations and to
temptations to conceal, distort, or mischaracterize events.
Extending the meaning of "armed attack" and of "self-defense,"
multiplying exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force and the
occasions that would permit military intervention, would undermine
the law of the Charter
and the international order established in the
51
wake of world war.

III. WHY THE BAN Is BINDING
Despite the eminent sense these rules make-both the moral sense
and the common sense-as Americans, we have been told by some of
our most prominent political scientists since Hans Morgenthau in the
1960s that international law does not ultimately bind the United States
in its drive for power. 52 These political scientists were joined by Bush
Administration lawyers after September 11 who also cast doubt on
international law. Henkin sought to answer Morgenthau and, to a
greater extent, the realist diplomat George Kennan, in his now-classic
book How Nations Behave.5 3 Henkin pointed out that Morgenthau's
chief critique of international law-that it lacks effective
enforcement-is not the ultimate test of a legal system and is not
determinative of whether international law rules or any legal rules
bind.54
Rather, it is the belief in the binding nature of law
demonstrated by compliance that makes law binding. The belief in
the binding nature of international law is amply demonstrated as
Henkin famously observed in that "almost all nations observe almost

51.

Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT:

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 60 (Louis

Henkin et al. eds., 1989).

52. Id.
53. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed.
1979) [hereinafter How NATIONS BEHAVE].

54. Id. at 26.
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law and almost all of their obligations
all principles of international
55
time.",
the
of
all
almost
Henkin was influenced by the British legal philosopher H.L.A.
Hart, who responded to the narrow view of what constituted "law"
prevailing in the United Kingdom and United States since John Austin
promoted it in the early nineteenth century. Hart reduced Austin's
dismissal of international law from the realm of law to two main
points: Austin's simplistic command/sanction definition of law, and
the idea that sovereign states could not be ultimately subject to legal
rules. Hart's concept of law did not rely on an essential role for
sanctions. He considered sanctions to be secondary-playing a role in
assuring majority compliance, but not as an essential element of a
make
legal rule. It is the fact of recognition or acceptance of rules that
56
violator.
each
away
hauls
policeman
a
whether
not
rules,
them
As for the possibility of sovereign states being subject to law in
the first place, Hart, like Hans Kelsen, reminds us that states consist of
a population living in a territory under a legal system.5 7 States come
in great variety, so it is not to the states themselves but to international
law that one must look to determine which entities are actually
sovereign. 58 It is within the rules of international law that sovereignty
is defined. Within those rules we find that the law can bind even
sovereign states. The facts of international life bear this out. Thus,
Hart concluded that international law is law, though in a more
primitive form than the law of most national systems. International
law is characterized largely by self-help in cases of breach. "Yet if
rules are in fact accepted as standards of conduct, and supported with
appropriate forms of social pressure distinctive of obligatory rules,

55. Id. at 47.
56. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-99 (2d ed. 1994)
(describing law as a system of primary and secondary rules, criminal sanctions
M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S
falling into the latter, less significant category);
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 215 (7th ed. 2001) ("The essence of a legal
system is the inherent fact, based on various psychological factors, that law is
accepted by the community as a whole as binding, and the element of sanction is not
an essential, or perhaps even an important, element in the functioning of the
system.").
57. HART, supra note 56, at 220-26.

58. Id.
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nothing more is required to show that they are binding rules ..

.

International law rules are "thought and spoken of as obligatory; there
is general pressure for conformity to the rules; claims and admissions
are based on them and their breach is held to justify not only insistent
demands for compensation, but reprisals and counter-measures." 60 It
is logical that states have a system of binding rules superior to the will
of any one state.
Henkin, like Hart, stressed that one need only look at the facts of
international life to see that states accept international law. And, like
Hart, Henkin understood acceptance as the key to understanding
whether a community has a legal system. Henkin wrote out of
concern that the combination of Morgenthau's powerful critique of
international law and the dramatic events of the 1960s were obscuring
the importance of international law in U.S. foreign policy. To bolster
respect for international law among the realists making U.S. policy,
Henkin's book recalls the iconic story of America's founding. Henkin
emphasized that the Founding Fathers were the type of pragmatic
statesmen who understood the value of international law. 6 ' The U.S.
Constitution reflects the importance of gaining the respect of other
nations. Its drafters recognized the protections that a new state like
the United States could find in international law. International law
continued to play a useful role in U.S. foreign policy, even as the
United States achieved a position of predominance in the world, a
predominance often compared with imperial Rome. Henkin argued
that America's national interest continued to lie in respecting the law
and even building it, whether the risk of facing a penalty for law
violation was small or not.
Thomas Franck of New York University took the next logical step
following Henkin's contribution by considering international law a
system that simply has no sanctions. In observing state behavior,
Franck sees much compliance even in the absence of any real concern
about sanctions. He concludes that international law is a non-coercive
system and sets out to show that other phenomena besides mere selfinterest or coercion must account for compliance with international
law rules. Franck developed a concept he called "legitimacy" to
59. Id. at 234.
60. Id. at 220.
61. How NATIONS

BEHAVE,

supra note 53, at 62.
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explain obedience to international rules. 62 Compliance results when
rules exhibit certain characteristics, namely, when they are
determinant, coherent, validated, and result in adherence. In Franck's
terms, such rules are perceived to be legitimate and understood to be
deserving of compliance. Even for those of us who understand
international law does have sanctions, Franck's thesis can explain
compliance in those cases where it is clear that no sanction will result.
U.S. leaders know, for example, that only in rare cases, such as in the
area of trade, will the United States possibly be subject to sanctions. 63
Yet, the United States complies with the vast majority of its
obligations.
Franck concentrates more on rule legitimacy than on the
legitimacy of the international legal system in general. But, like Hart,
Franck sees a chain of validity within rule systems. A primary rule is
legitimate if it was created through a valid process. The process is
valid if it was created with state consent. Why state consent gives
validity
cannot be demonstrated by reference to any other validating rules or
procedures, but only by the conduct of nations manifesting their
belief in the ultimate rules' validity as the irreducibleprerequisites
for an international concept of right process.

It can only be

inferred, that is from64 the nature of the international system as a
community of states.
The community of states and its law began taking on more
sophisticated forms at the end of the twentieth century, concurrent
with the end of the Cold War. Courts began playing a larger role in
the proper application of rules and sanctions. Litigation in the United
States to enforce international norms began to increase substantially in
the 1990s, but so did the use of courts generally-the I.C.J., human
62. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3-26
(1990).
63. Significant sanctions were authorized against the United States. For
example, the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body for Unlawful Cotton Subsidies issued
sanctions during this time. Trade Body Rules Against U.S. on Cotton Subsidies: The
WTO Finding, a Victory for Brazil and African Countries, Could Lead to Huge

Sanctions, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2007, www.latimes.com/news/nationworld
/world/africa/la-fi-wtol 6oct 16,1,7636981.story?coll=la-africa.
64.

FRANCK, supra note 62, at 193-94.
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rights courts, trade courts and tribunals, and international criminal
courts.

Just as the Cold War was ending and these new possibilities for
international law-making, application, and enforcement were
emerging, a small group of political theorists dubbed "neoconservatives" gained top political positions in the Bush
Administration taking office in 2000. Their views had much in
common with Morgenthau, although they are thought to be inspired
by another University of Chicago academic, a contemporary of
Morgenthau, named Leo Strauss. Strauss shared with Morgenthau the
view that American foreign policy should aim at pursuing power for
the United States with no limit on the right to use military force. A
number of Strauss's students argued for using American military
power to advance U.S. hegemony. The neo-conservatives brought
with them lawyers antagonistic to international law. These lawyers
held views in sync with the neo-conservatives regarding the
President's authority to use military power. They asserted the
President has largely unfettered power as commander-in-chief and in
the conduct of foreign policy. 65 In their view, neither Congress nor
the courts should interfere with this power. They advised the
President that he need not respect the constraints of international law
in important areas, such as in the use of harsh methods of
interrogation, including torture and rendition to secret prisons. Some
66
of this advice is documented in the Torture Papers.
The primary author of several memos, including the most
infamous of the memos on torture, was John Yoo, who left the
Administration to return to the University of California Berkley in
2003. Another memo writer, Jack Goldsmith, now of Harvard Law
School, was the sole author of a memo on transferring protected
persons out of Iraq to secret prisons for purposes of interrogation.67
These memos quickly brought condemnation because they were seen
as a threat to the American constitutional order and an affront to basic

65. See JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 24-29 (2005).
66. E.g., Jack Goldsmith, Permissibility of Relocating Certain "Protected
Persons"from Occupied Iraq, in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB

(Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
67. Id. at 366.
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morality. Less was said by courts and commentators in the United
States about international law and its power to bind the President,
despite the fact that the use of torture violates a peremptory norm of
international law, and transfer to secret detention is a grave breach of
the Geneva Conventions. 68 The discussion in the years following the
public release of the Torture Papers revealed doubts by some
American scholars about the power of international law to bind the
United States
Despite these doubts, there is something about international law
that commands respect in this country. The United States was
founded on the idea that law should be superior to any leader. As
Henkin pointed out, since its founding, American leaders have spoken
eloquently on the importance of international law. Despite the
theories of Morgenthau, Strauss, and their followers, U.S. presidents
have never walked away from international law. Indeed, they never
publicly denigrate it. Many Americans want to remain supportive of
the global consensus on moral conduct reflected in international law's
most important principles. Apparently, memos collected in the
Torture Papers were written for the very reason that so many in the
U.S. government felt bound by international law. The memos
contained in the Torture Papers are a reflection of the power of
international law in that U.S. leaders did not simply order torture,
abuse, and transfer to secret prisons. Instead, they requested legal
advice first and received long, detailed memos with astounding errors,
omissions, and misrepresentations of the law but still adequate enough
to convince officials to authorize holding persons in secret prisons and
subjecting them to harsh methods of interrogation. When the legal
analysis in the memos was revealed, human rights lawyers argued that
the memo writers were complicit in the crimes that followed from the
advice. 69 The outcry over the mistreatment of detainees and the
68. For a full discussion of international law's ban on harsh interrogation, see
Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation,66 OHIO. ST. L.J.

1231, 1241-47 (2005). For a discussion of the international law's absolute ban on
transfer of protected persons, see Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black
Sites: ExtraordinaryRendition Under InternationalLaw, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 309, 324-39 (2006).
69. See CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, BACKGROUND BRIEF ON THE
CASE
AGAINST
RUMSFELD,
GONZALES
AND
OTHERS,
http://www.ccr-

ny.org/v2/GermanCase20O6/extendedsummary.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).
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arguments for holding even the lawyers criminally responsible for
giving false advice on international law may well serve to strengthen
international law.
With international law working as an obstacle to certain Bush
Administration policies, proponents of American dominance renewed
the attack on international law generally. In this context, Jack
Goldsmith and Eric Posner produced a book titled The Limits of
International Law. It concluded that international law is not really
law, but rather "a special kind of politics." 7 ° John Yoo and Robert
Delahunty have written along similar lines in Executive Power v.
InternationalLaw. 7 1 Yet, as Henkin wrote decades ago with respect
to the rules on the use of force, it is not in the U.S. national interest to
dilute or eliminate the rules of international law, for even greater
disorder and chaos may result. What Goldsmith and other authors
may have in mind is a system of U.S. exceptionalism-the United
States gets privileges to do what it wants, but the rest of the world
must comply with the rules. The only way to maintain rules, however,
is through a general system of international law-with a general
theory of obligation, sources, adjudication, and enforcement.
The United States cannot effectively dominate the world;
furthermore, the rest of the world has no interest in allowing the
United States to hold a position of general exceptionalism. By
weakening international law through their quasi- scientific conclusions
that international law is not law, Goldsmith and Posner undermine the
prospects for achieving an orderly world under the rule of law and
progress toward fulfillment of humanity's most fundamental
aspirations.
IV. CONCLUSION

This point brings us back to why international law is binding,
including its rules on force. The international community uses
international law to accomplish its most important purposes because it
accepts that international law binds. It is this acceptance, this belief-

70. JACK L.
LAW

GOLDSMITH

&

ERIC

A.

POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL

202 (2005).

71. John Yoo & Robert Delahunty, Executive Power v. InternationalLaw, 30
HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73, 112-13 (2006).
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once based on religious belief-which forms the basis of all law. 72
Belief in the authority of law is an inheritance from an age when
nearly all of those who thought about law believed in God and in the
ability to apply reason to understanding what God ordained in the
form of law. This is our inheritance. We are now committed to
respect for the authority of law as law. The international community
shows daily and in myriad ways acceptance of international law's
authority. It is through international law that humanity has sought to
realize its most profound moral principles: its desire to end war, to
respect human rights, to end poverty, and to preserve the natural
environment. Binding rules, such as those restraining the use of force
and requiring peaceful settlement of disputes, are the foremost tools
for moving forward. Legal rules bind if they come through a system
we believe in with recognized sources backed by sanctions.
We have such rules regulating the use of force. Americans are
learning the high price of violating them in the case of Iraq and
Afghanistan. This high price should deter an attack on Iran. For the
sake of innocent Iranian civilians and brave American troops, all
Americans should realize the value of international law to, in the
words of the Charter, "save succeeding generations from the scourge
of war ....

72.

For a brief history of the relationship between belief in law's authority and

belief in God, see STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY (2004).

73. U.N. Charter pmbl.
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